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2Foreword The Public Oversight Board is pleased to 
report in this, its eleventh annual report, 
that the SEC Practice Section's programs 
are sound, rigorously applied, and continue 
to enhance the quality of audit practice of 
member firms. During the year ended June 
30, 1989, the Board gathered considerable 
evidence to support such conclusions: one 
or more Board members accompanied by 
staff attended every meeting of the Sec­
tion's three major committees, and the 
Board held a joint meeting with the Quality 
Control Inquiry Committee; on other occa­
sions, it met with representatives of the 
Peer Review Committee and Executive 
Committee; its staff carefully reviewed 
every peer review performed and the work 
of the Quality Control Inquiry Committee 
task forces; and the Board considered 
the reports of its staff concerning these 
activities.
The attendance of Board members at 
Section committee meetings produces 
several benefits. It makes committee mem­
bers acutely aware of the Board's interest 
in their activities and allows committee 
members to hear directly from Board mem­
bers their views on matters concerning the 
public interest. Board members observe 
firsthand the efforts put forth by member 
firm representatives in developing and 
operating the Section's programs. This 
active oversight provides a broad base of 
information and experience, which the 
Board uses to offer advice and suggestions, 
to criticize when necessary, to compliment 
when appropriate, and to judge whether 
the program serves the public interest.
Board members also participated in a 
number of activities relating to the account­
ing profession at large. POB Chairman Al 
Sommer met with the AICPA Board of 
Directors and addressed the Spring Meet­
ing of AICPA Council. The full Board met 
with the chairman and key staff officers of 
the Institute and with representatives of 
various organizations interested in the 
accounting profession's self-regulatory 
program.
We conducted four of our nine meet­
ings outside New York City in order to meet 
with practitioners, regulators, and legisla­
tors on matters relating to the self-regula­
tory program and the profession in general. 
Our goals in these meetings are to make 
the SECPS program better known, to 
explain our role and responsibilities, and, 
most importantly, to be apprised of the 
views and concerns of those interested in 
the program. We were pleased with the 
responsiveness of those who participated 
in our first "Outreach Program"—a round­
table discussion with the managing part­
ners of local firms headquartered in Minne­
apolis and St. Paul and representatives of 
the Minnesota Society of CPAs and of the 
Minnesota State Board of Accountancy. We 
held a similar session in June with the man­
aging partners of seven large local firms 
headquartered in New York City. We plan to 
hold two or three such meetings annually 
in various cities throughout the country.
Managing partners at both meetings 
expressed satisfaction with the self-regula­
tory process and view the peer review pro­
gram as being both essential and valuable 
to them in monitoring and improving the 
quality of their firms' accounting and 
auditing practices.
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Some participants at both meetings 
expressed concerns that "professionalism" 
among members of the profession is de­
clining and that auditors were being consid­
ered less and less as professionals by out­
siders. Opinions were expressed that audit 
services are no longer considered the pri­
mary service offered by some CPA firms. 
Participants indicated that some firms ap­
pear to be performing audits for fees that 
do not cover variable costs. In an editorial* 
Vice Chairman Bob Mautz has called atten­
tion to two contrasting concepts of profes­
sionalism, and has raised questions regard­
ing the ultimate effect of forces impinging 
on public accounting and whether public 
accounting can survive as a traditional pro­
fession. These and other trends impacting 
auditing have long-term negative implica­
tions which the accounting profession must 
guard against. See page 22 for additional 
commentary.
During the current year, the Board 
established The John J. McCloy Award for 
Outstanding Contributions to Audit Excel­
lence. Details of the first presentations of 
the award are noted on page 10.
John Abernathy of BDO Seidman and 
David Pearson of Arthur Young & Company 
have completed their third and final years 
as chairmen of the SECPS Executive Com­
mittee and Peer Review Committee, respec­
tively. It would be remiss on our part if we 
did not acknowledge the effective and vigi­
lant manner in which they have discharged 
their leadership responsibilities in maintain­
ing and enhancing the high standards of 
their predecessors.
*Mautz, Robert K., "Public Accounting: Which Kind of 
Professionalism?" Accounting Horizons, September 
1988.
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5Report o f 
The Public 
Oversight Board
We are pleased to report that during the year ended June 30, 1989, the Public 
Oversight Board implemented its mandate, as described in the Organizational Structure 
and Functions Document of the SEC Practice Section of the Division for CPA Firms of 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, by conducting a comprehensive 
program of oversight of the activities of the Section.
In carrying out our responsibilities to represent the public interest in the Section's 
self-regulatory program, members of the Board and staff attended and participated in all 
meetings of the Executive, Peer Review, and Quality Control Inquiry Committees of the 
Section during the year.
We reviewed all revisions to the standards for performing and reporting on peer 
reviews and the materials developed to train those who conduct such reviews. We also 
tested compliance with those standards through application of our visitation, workpaper, 
and report review programs on all peer reviews performed in 1988.
We reviewed the operation of the Quality Control Inquiry Committee to ascertain 
whether its activities are conducted with the public interest as their primary objective.
We monitored the committee's analysis of and inquiries into all cases reported by mem­
ber firms by, among other means, attending a majority of its task force meetings with 
firms at which inquiry was made concerning the quality control implications of cases.
We also performed on-site oversight on all special reviews conducted during the year.
We monitored the follow-up actions taken by the Peer Review and Quality Control 
Inquiry Committees to assure that member firms take the required corrective actions to 
eliminate quality control deficiencies noted by peer review and special review teams.
We monitored and evaluated the activities of the Executive Committee and its 
Planning Subcommittee, the adequacy of membership requirements, and the appoint­
ments to the Section's committees and task forces.
In our opinion, the programs of the SEC Practice Section are suitably comprehen­
sive and operating in a manner that reasonably assures a high quality of accounting and 
auditing practice by its member firms. Nevertheless, as commented on in the discussion 
section that follows, we noted areas in which the Section's programs can be improved or 
operated more effectively. Consistent with our charge, such matters have been communi­
cated to officials of the Section.
June 30, 1989
ROBERT F. FROEHLKE
Discussion 
of Board 
Activities*
to June 30, 1989
The Board monitors and evaluates the 
activities of the SEC Practice Section and 
makes recommendations for improving the 
operation and the effectiveness of the Sec­
tion's programs. The Board is autonomous 
and consists of five members representing 
a broad spectrum of business, professional, 
regulatory and legislative experience. To 
assure its independence and objectivity, the 
Board appoints its own members, chair­
man, and staff, and establishes its own 
compensation and operating procedures.
The primary responsibility of the Board 
is to assure that the public interest is care­
fully considered when the Section sets, 
revises, and enforces standards, member­
ship requirements, rules, and procedures. 
The Board, assisted by legal counsel, a staff 
of four CPAs, and two administrative assis­
tants, discharges its responsibilities through 
application of appropriate oversight pro­
cedures to all phases of the Section's 
activities.
It should be noted that we believe our 
charge from the profession includes con­
cern for how the profession is perceived. 
Accordingly, in this report, we call attention 
to some actions and trends that cause us 
concern, in some measures because of the 
perceptions they create.
Scope o f Board Oversight. While 
the Board has no formal jurisdiction beyond 
monitoring the activities of the Section, it 
has interpreted its mission to include 
speaking out on issues affecting the credi­
bility of the independent auditor's report 
and the role and responsibility of the audi­
tor. Accordingly, the Board has established 
strong liaison relationships with all compo­
nents of the profession and also with the 
Commissioners, Chief Accountant, and 
staff of the SEC, and with the Comptroller- 
General of the U.S. Both the SEC and the
*Continuing the practice started last year, the SEC 
Practice Section is issuing a report on its operations and 
the results o f its peer review, quality control inquiry, and 
other activities. This eleventh annual report of the Board 
should be read in conjunction with the Section's 1988- 
89 annual report.
GAO are vitally interested in the CPA pro­
fession and the effectiveness of its self- 
regulatory program. We monitor all com­
ments, reports, and proposals these 
agencies issue that affect the profession 
and the role and responsibility of the audi­
tor in the financial reporting process.
During the year, the Board spoke out 
on several issues which it deemed within 
its scope of oversight, although the resolu­
tion of such issues could come only from 
outside the Section.
Mandatory Peer Review. The Board 
strongly believes that every firm should 
undergo peer review and one that audits 
public companies should undergo peer 
review as a member of the SEC Practice 
Section. Peer review is an effective means 
of assuring the public that a firm has per­
formed its accounting and auditing engage­
ments at a satisfactory level of professional 
achievement; membership in the Section 
identifies a firm dedicated to providing high 
quality accounting and auditing services.
Under a current SEC proposal, the 
Commission (a) would set peer review 
standards, and (b) require a firm that audits 
SEC registrants to belong to a peer review 
organization acceptable to the Commission 
and to undergo either periodic peer reviews 
as rigorous as those of the SEC Practice 
Section or peer reviews conducted by 
the SEC. While we favor mandatory peer 
review, we believe the public interest is 
best served when peer review standards 
are set in and peer reviews are conducted 
by the private sector. See page 21 for addi­
tional commentary.
Independence Rules. At our
request, during the year the Section's Peer 
Review Committee referred three matters 
to the AlCPA's Professional Ethics Execu­
tive Committee for its consideration and 
resolution. These matters involved appar­
ent misinterpretation by three different 
firms of the ethical rules regarding auditor 
independence.
6
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During the year, we learned that the 
Chief Accountant of the SEC had been 
asked to issue a modification of the Com­
mission's independence rule so that an 
audit firm would not be deemed to have 
impaired its independence by performing 
services in a prime-subcontractor relation­
ship with an audit client for a third party, if 
the fees received for such services were 
immaterial in amount. Because of the pos­
sible impact such relationships could have 
on auditor independence and public per­
ception of auditor independence, the Board 
urged the Commission to seek public com­
ment on the request.
Role and Responsibility o f the 
Auditor. During the year, the Board asked 
the Section to bring to the Auditing Stan­
dards Board's attention a matter which 
surfaced during the course of our oversight 
of the quality control inquiry process. As a 
result, the Auditing Standards Board placed 
on its agenda a project to determine the 
degree of understanding an auditor, in the 
absence of an audit base, should have of an 
entity's control structure in order to issue a 
review report on the entity's interim finan­
cial statements, particularly when the review 
report is to be included in a prospectus.
The Board has proposed a liaison rela­
tionship with the recently restructured Plan­
ning Committee of the Auditing Standards 
Board which includes three members not 
currently in public practice. This direct com­
munications link will facilitate Board input 
into the standard-setting process.
Proposed Management Report on 
Internal Control and Auditor Associa­
tion with Such Report. The SEC has
issued for public comment a proposal that 
management issue a report on its internal 
control system, including an assessment of 
that system's effectiveness. The Board 
wrote the SEC in support of such proposal, 
but noted that it should not be adopted 
until the Auditing Standards Board had 
decided what an auditor must do in order
to comment on management's assertions 
when the auditor had not been engaged to 
examine and issue a report on internal con­
trols. In addition, the Board agrees with the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of 
the Treadway Commission that adoption of 
the proposal should be delayed until criteria 
for management's use in evaluating the 
adequacy of a company's internal controls 
had been identified and agreed on by all 
concerned parties. That committee has 
been the catalyst for a research effort to 
develop such criteria.
AICPA Special Assistant to the 
Chairman B. Z. Lee and Vice 
President-Federal Government 
Relations Joe Moraglio with 
POB Vice Chairman Bob 
Mautz and POB staff members 
Lou Matusiak and Chuck Evers 
at the POB's January 10, 1989 
meeting.
Increased Board Visibility. The
Board, ever mindful that the profession's 
self-regulatory activities are virtually 
unknown by the financial and business 
communities and, for that matter, not suffi­
ciently well-known within the accounting 
profession, has endeavored to inform mem­
bers of the profession and the business and 
financial communities about the Section's 
programs and the Board's role therein. The 
calendar on pages 24-25 summarizes the 
Board's extensive involvement in the self- 
regulatory process.
During the year, the Board conducted 
two "outreach programs"—one in Minne­
apolis/St. Paul and the other in New York 
City—during which the Board had round­
table discussions with management repre­
sentatives of local firms headquartered in 
those areas. Representatives of the Minne­
sota Society of CPAs and the Minnesota 
State Board of Accountancy also attended 
the Minneapolis meeting. Reactions to both 
meetings were very positive. The Board 
heard the concerns of local practitioners on
a wide range of topics, including their per­
ceptions of professionalism, the difficulty 
that smaller firms have in complying with 
certain Section membership requirements, 
and the lack of recognition within the busi­
ness and financial communities of the sig­
nificance of membership in the Section.
Outreach Meeting in N ew  York
The meeting was attended by representatives of seven large local firms headquartered in New York City.
(Left to right) Phil Zimmerman, 
POB Chairman A l Sommer, POB 
Technical Director Chuck Evers, 
POB Vice Chairman Bob Mautz, 
POB Executive Director 
Lou Matusiak, Gerry Golub,
Eli Hoffman of Richard A. Eisner 
& Co., and Gerald Marsden 
of Eisner & Lubin.
POB member Bob Froehlke and Norman Gerald Golub of Goldstein, Golub, Kessler & Company and Philip
Lipshie of Weber, Lipshie & Co. Zimmerman of Paneth, Haber & Zimmerman with POB member
Paul McCracken.
(Left to right) Jerry Sullivan (appointed POB Executive Director effective October 1, 1989), POB member Mel Laird, Kenneth 
Weiser of M. R. Weiser & Co., A l Sommer, Paul McCracken, and Phil Zimmerman. Roger Donohue of Edward Isaacs & Co. also 
attended the meeting.
8
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Outreach Meeting in Minneapolis-St. Paul
The meeting was attended by the managing partners of six CPA firms headquartered in Minneapolis-St. Paul 
and representatives o f the Minnesota State Board of Accountancy and the Minnesota Society o f CPAs.
Dave Nelson of McGladrey & Pullen and POB Chairman Al Sommer.
POB members Bob Froehlke and Mel Laird and Minnesota 
State Board of Accountancy Executive Secretary Pam Smith.
POB Technical Director Chuck Evers and POB Assistant Technical 
Director John Cullen.
Richard Hansen of Hansen, Jergensen & Co. and Dennis Peterson of 
Bouiay Heutmaker, Zibell & Co.
Pam Smith and 
Minnesota State 
Board of Accoun­
tancy Chairman 
Michael Vekich.
The Board intends to hold at least two such 
meetings annually in various cities across 
the country to gain continuing insight into 
the problems and concerns of practitioners, 
and to use such input in improving the 
operations of the Board and the Section.
The John J. McCloy Award. This 
award, named in honor of the Board's first 
chairman, who was an outstanding states­
man and public servant extraordinaire, hon­
ors persons who have served the public 
and the profession by making outstanding 
contributions to audit excellence. At the 
Annual AICPA National Conference on SEC
Developments in January 1989, the Board 
presented John J. McCloy Awards to two 
practitioners who gave unstintingly of their 
time and talents as chairmen of the initial 
Peer Review Committees of the SEC Prac­
tice Section and Private Companies Prac­
tice Section: Donald L. Neebes of Ernst & 
Whinney and James P. Luton, Jr., a sole 
practitioner in Oklahoma City. The Board's 
choices of these CPAs as initial recipients 
for the award were widely applauded. The 
Board intends to present this award annu­
ally to persons selected for their meritori­
ous contributions to audit excellence.
POB Vice Chairman 
Bob Mautz and POB 
Chairman A l Sommer 
with the first recipi­
ents of The John J. 
McCloy Award for 
Outstanding Contribu­
tions to Audit Excel­
lence, James P.
Luton, Jr. of Luton & 
Company in Okla­
homa City and Donald 
L. Neebes of Ernst & 
Whinney.
1 0
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Oversight 
o f the 
Peer Review 
Process
The Board's most significant charter 
responsibility is to monitor and evaluate 
the effectiveness of the Section's peer 
review process. Peer review is the keystone 
of the profession's self-regulatory effort. 
Member firms participate to assure them­
selves and the public that they are deliver­
ing high quality professional auditing and 
accounting services.
The Peer Review Committee estab­
lishes and enforces peer review standards 
and administers the peer review program.
It also obtains sufficient evidence to assure 
itself that member firms have adequate 
quality control policies and procedures, are 
in compliance with them, and are taking 
corrective actions to remedy any deficien­
cies noted. The Board uses a wide-ranging 
"hands-on" oversight program to ensure 
that the committee discharges these 
responsibilities in the best interests of 
the public.
Types o f Oversight Programs. The
Board's monitoring procedures include staff 
review of each peer review administered 
by the Section, using one of three oversight 
programs. The programs vary in intensity. 
All test the review team's application of the 
peer review performance and reporting 
standards.
The type of oversight program applied 
to a given review is based upon attributes 
of the firm to be reviewed and of the 
review team. The attributes given the 
most consideration are:
■ Firm to be reviewed:
Number o f SEC audit clients
Type of report issued on the firm's prior review
Number of professional staff
Number and types o f auditing and accounting 
engagements
Type of POB oversight program used on prior 
review
■ Review Team:
Evaluation of performance on prior reviews
Experience in relation to the nature, size, and 
complexity of the practice of the 
reviewed firm.
The POB uses three oversight pro­
grams with varying degrees of attention to 
the review team's performance, its evalua­
tion of the firm's quality control system, 
and its reporting of results obtained 
therefrom.
■ Visitation and Workpaper Review.
This includes "on-site" observation of the 
review of one or more operating offices, 
attendance at the final exit conference, 
and review of all the review team's 
workpapers, the peer review report, the 
letter of comments, and the firm's response. 
During the 1988 review year, the Board's 
staff, at times accompanied by a Board 
member, attended 49 operating office 
and final exit conferences held in conjunc­
tion with the reviews of 42 firms. The 
visitation and workpaper review program 
was applied, as has been past practice, to 
all reviews of firms with five or more SEC 
clients and to reviews of other firms on a 
stratified random sample basis.
■ Workpaper Review. This includes a 
comprehensive review of all the review 
team's workpapers, the report, the
letter of comments, and the firm's response. 
During the 1988 review year, the Board's 
staff applied this program to the reviews 
of 41 firms, including, as in the past, the 
reviews of all firms with less than five 
SEC clients that were not randomly 
selected for the visitation program, and a 
stratified random sample of reviews of 
firms with no SEC clients.
■ Report Review. This includes a staff 
review of selected portions of the review 
team's workpapers, peer review report, 
letter of comments, and the firm's 
response. It is applied to all peer reviews 
not subjected to the above programs. If 
such review indicates a possible misappli­
cation of peer review standards, the 
scope of Board oversight is extended to 
the review of all the review team's 
workpapers. The report review program 
was applied to 29 of the 112 reviews 
performed in 1988.
Scope of POB Oversight 
of 1988 Peer Reviews 
Classified by Number of 
SEC Registrants Audited 
by Reviewed Firm
Observe Peer Review 
in Progress and 
Attend
Exit Conference
And
Review of All
Peer Review Team's
Workpapers
Review of Al
Peer Review Team's 
Workpapers
Review of
Peer Review Reports 
and Selected 
Workpapers
Review of 
Peer Review Reports
Review of 
Peer Review Reports
29 Firms with no 
SEC Clients
11 Firms with
5 or more SEC Clients
16 Firms with
1 to 4 SEC Clients
15 Firms with 
no SEC Clients
Evaluation o f Individual Peer 
Review Reports. The Board closely 
monitors the adherence to standards 
by peer review teams and by the Peer 
Review Committee.
Prior to each Peer Review Committee 
meeting, the Board's staff meets with the 
committee's staff and a subcommittee of
three committee members to discuss 
results of individual reviews and the reports 
to be considered for acceptance at the fol­
lowing committee meeting. The group 
identifies issues to be brought to the atten­
tion of the committee in the report-accept­
ance process. Questions asked include:
Was the review effective? Are the report
20 Firms with
1 to 4 SEC Clients
21 Firms with 
no SEC Clients
12
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and letter of comments appropriately candid 
and complete? Has the firm taken or com­
mitted to take appropriate corrective 
actions? Should the firm be required to 
provide evidence that such action was 
taken? Many of these questions are 
addressed prior to the meeting so that the 
committee's chairman and staff may be 
early apprised of serious questions and 
concerns raised by the POB staff during the 
course of applying the POB oversight pro­
grams. In every instance, the committee 
has satisfactorily responded to staff ques­
tions and concerns.
During the year, Board and staff mem­
bers attended all meetings of the commit­
tee and participated in the discussions of 
the performance of review teams and the 
evaluations of individual review reports 
whenever appropriate to do so.
The high level and frequency of com­
munication between the committee's chair­
man and staff and the Board's staff is in 
large measure responsible for the satisfac­
tory and timely resolution of any and all 
questions that have arisen. The Board com­
mends the committee members for 
their commitment and dedication to the 
program.
Timely Processing o f Reviews.
Policy requires that a review team issue its 
report to the reviewed firm no later than 
thirty days after the exit conference. The 
reviewed firm must respond by letter and 
identify the actions it plans to take with 
respect to every deficiency noted in the 
review team's letter of comments. That 
letter, the peer review report, and the letter 
of comments are required to be submitted 
to the committee no later than thirty days 
after the receipt of the review team's report 
and letter of comments. The majority of 
review teams and reviewed firms complied 
with these time requirements. By June 30, 
1989, all reports on the 112 peer reviews 
performed in 1988 had been processed by 
the committee.
The committee's vigorous pursuit 
of late filings, often through the personal
involvement of the chairman, is the primary 
reason why all the peer review reports for 
reviews performed in 1988 were processed 
by the committee on or before June 30, 
1989. The Board commends the committee 
for expediting the processing of reports, 
thus decreasing the length of time between 
the discovery of a deficiency in a firm's 
quality control system and assurance to the 
committee that the firm has taken appropri­
ate corrective action.
Monitoring Committee Follow-up 
Actions. The committee requires a firm 
with serious deficiencies in the design of its 
quality control system, or pervasive non- 
compliance with important quality control 
policies and procedures, to demonstrate 
that it has taken corrective measures. 
Sometimes the committee even specifies 
actions that the firm must take.
The Board monitors committee follow­
up actions and, by so doing, is made aware 
of the quality control improvements 
effected. Follow-up actions are not limited 
to ensuring that firms implement appropri­
ate corrective actions. The committee is 
just as rigorous in evaluating the perfor­
mance of the review team captain and 
members, and culling out from its "re­
viewer bank" those whose work is deemed 
to be substandard.
Peer Review Standards. The
standards for conducting peer reviews and 
reporting their results are continuously 
reevaluated to assure that peer review is a 
probing process sufficiently recognizing the 
dynamic environment in which audits are 
conducted. Some changes in standards 
and procedures are made as a result of 
new circumstances encountered. Other 
changes in standards were adopted during 
the 1988-89 year in response to our con­
cerns and those expressed by the Securi­
ties and Exchange Commission, the Gen­
eral Accounting Office (GAO), the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting (Treadway Commission), and the 
U.S. House of Representatives Committee
on Energy and Commerce (Dingell
Committee):
■ As the result of a change in SEC 
regulations, peer review teams are now 
required to review initial audits performed 
by the reviewed firms for SEC registrants 
for which a "reportable event" was 
reported in a Form 8K by the predecessor 
auditor.
■ As the result of the GAO's adoption of 
revised government auditing standards 
which require firms that conduct specified 
audits to meet minimum requirements, 
peer review teams are now required to 
review compliance with these standards.
■ As the result of a recommendation of the 
Treadway Commission, peer review 
standards now require review teams to 
select for review those offices of the 
reviewed firm that had performed the 
greatest number of initial audits of public 
companies, and to review at least one 
such audit performed in each office visited.
■ As the result of a concern expressed by 
the Dingell Committee that the SEC is not 
being notified quickly enough of potential 
problems, the Section now requires a 
member to notify a former client in writ­
ing of termination of the auditor-client 
relationship within five business days of 
such termination and to send a copy of 
such letter to the SEC Chief Accountant 
at the same time. Peer review teams are 
required to test compliance with this 
requirement.
■ As the result of concerns expressed by
the POB and the SEC, review teams are 
now required to test not only the com­
pleteness but also the timeliness of re­
porting litigation to the Quality Control 
Inquiry Committee.
Improvements in Quality of 
Practice. The Board concurs with the 
Section's conclusion that the peer review 
process has improved the quality of audit 
practice of member firms. These improve­
ments are discussed at length in the ac­
companying annual report of the Section.
Peer review is a vibrant and relevant 
program that benefits both reviewed firms 
and reviewers. As reported in an April 1989 
Journal of Accountancy article entitled "Les­
sons Learned from Peer Review" coau­
thored by our Technical Director, Charles J. 
Evers, and PRC Chairman David B. Pearson, 
all firms, even those that have been peer 
reviewed several times, derive benefits 
from each review.
A firm cannot become complacent as 
a result of having received an unqualified 
report on its peer review. Compliance with 
quality control policies and procedures 
must be emphasized continually and moni­
tored carefully. Two firms apparently did 
not heed such advice; the firms received 
modified reports in 1988 after receiving 
unqualified reports on their 1985 reviews. 
Managements of member firms must be 
committed to maintaining quality service, 
communicating that commitment through­
out the firm, and continuously monitoring 
compliance with quality control policies 
and procedures.
POB Chairman AI Sommer with 
PRC members Harry DeVerter 
and Tom Stemlar at 
November 1, 1988 meeting.
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Oversight 
o f the 
Quality Control 
Inquiry Process
 
The quality control inquiry process supple­
ments the peer review process. It is admin­
istered by the Quality Control Inquiry Com­
mittee (QCIC), originally named the Special 
Investigations Committee (SIC), which 
reviews all litigation and government pro­
ceedings that allege a firm did not perform 
an audit of a publicly-held company in 
accordance with professional standards. All 
such litigation is required to be reported to 
the QCIC by member firms. The QCIC's 
task is to determine whether the allegations 
indicate possible deficiencies in the firm's 
quality controls.
Thus, the objectives of the peer review 
and QCIC processes coincide. The QCIC 
process supplements the peer review pro­
cess by evaluating the allegations in con­
tested audits and their implications. It 
determines whether to review certain 
aspects or operations of a firm's quality 
control system not reviewed by the peer 
review team, or in light of these allegations 
to review in greater depth certain aspects 
or operations that had recently been sub­
jected to peer review.
In addition, the QCIC's job is to analyze 
such litigation to determine whether profes­
sional standards, quality control standards, 
or the Section's membership requirements 
need revision or whether additional guid­
ance is needed.
Joint Meeting with the QCIC.
Last September, the Board met with the 
full Quality Control Inquiry Committee to 
exchange thoughts on the many thorny 
issues relevant to the credibility and effec­
tiveness of the QCIC process, focusing on 
issues requiring decisions in the 1988-89 
year. This joint meeting provided both the 
Board and committee members with a 
better understanding of the critical issues, 
and generated ideas on how they might be 
resolved in the best interests of the public 
and the member firms. These issues and 
proposed solutions are the subject matter 
of the balance of this section.
Change o f Committee Name.
During the year, the committee's name was 
changed from the Special Investigations 
Committee to the Quality Control Inquiry 
Committee. The Board and others had 
urged a name change for several years 
because the former name was considered 
misleading. An investigatory committee is 
generally perceived as intended to pass 
judgment on events and the responsibility 
for them. That was never intended to be 
the primary mission of this committee. Its 
mission is and always has been to gain 
assurance in the light of adverse allegations 
whether a firm's quality control system is 
adequate and being complied with. Hence, 
the name, "Quality Control Inquiry Com­
mittee," more appropriately describes this 
mission.
Evaluation o f Actions Taken on 
Individual Cases. The Board monitors 
the activities of the QCIC and has unre­
stricted access to the committee's files as 
well as to all meetings of the committee 
and its task forces. The Board's staff reads 
the complaint, pertinent financial state­
ments, other public documents, and rele­
vant professional literature for each 
reported case. During the 1988-89 year, all 
QCIC meetings were attended by one or 
more Board members and staff. Staff mem­
bers, at times accompanied by a Board 
member, also attended a substantial major­
ity of the meetings during which QCIC task 
forces and firm representatives discussed 
the quality control implications of the alle­
gations. Additionally, staff members 
observed the performance of all special 
reviews ordered by the committee. The 
staff reviewed all workpapers documenting 
the performance of the special review 
teams and attended closing meetings 
where the findings of the special reviews 
were reported to management representa­
tives of the firms reviewed. The results of 
these monitoring procedures are reported 
at each Board meeting.
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and POB Chairman 
A l Sommer. Generally, the Board concurred with 
decisions on individual cases made by the 
committee during the year. In one instance 
where a firm had conducted internal 
reviews of other engagements performed 
by the teams which had supervised alleg­
edly faulty audits, the Board concluded that 
the committee had not obtained sufficient 
documented evidence that the firm had 
implemented appropriate corrective action. 
While the committee had received broad 
oral assurance that needed actions had 
been taken, the Board felt the public inter­
est would be better served if the commit­
tee obtained greater assurance by review­
ing and testing the results obtained from 
the firm's internal reviews. The committee 
adopted the Board's recommendation and 
ascertained the specific actions the firm 
had taken.
Committee Communication with  
Standard-Setting Bodies. The QCIC has 
communicated, as appropriate, with the 
Auditing Standards Board and the Account­
ing Standards Executive Committee when­
ever the committee concluded additional 
guidance or clarification was needed con­
cerning accounting or auditing issues iden­
tified in reported cases. The Board com­
mends the committee for these efforts.
Timeliness o f Reporting Cases. In
our last year's report, we noted that some 
firms had not reported relevant litigation or 
proceedings to the committee, as required, 
within thirty days of filing or initiation. The 
matter was brought to the attention of the 
Executive Committee by the QCIC chair­
man, and procedures were implemented 
by the Section's staff to improve the timeli­
ness of reporting. However, some instances 
of late reporting were still observed. As a 
consequence, tardiness in reporting cases 
to the QCIC was included in a large firm's 
peer review letter of comments, and the 
Peer Review Committee revised review 
procedures so that the reporting of cases to 
the QCIC will be tested more extensively 
by peer review teams. We strongly urge 
member firms to develop, and enforce 
compliance with, procedures to assure 
timely reporting of cases to the QCIC so 
the committee can address the quality 
control implications of the allegations in a 
timely manner.
Improving the Effectiveness of 
the Process. The Board continues to be­
lieve that the quality control inquiry process 
is effective and operated in the public inter­
est. Improvements have been made in the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the process 
primarily through further implementation of 
the recommendations of the Task Force on 
SIC Methodology, which issued its report 
in 1987.
The committee during the year refined 
its inquiry process. In order to better serve 
the public interest and increase the willing­
ness of firms to cooperate with its requests, 
the committee developed procedures that 
permit discharge of its responsibilities while 
protecting the rights of a firm not to preju­
dice its defense in litigation. This requires a 
delicate balance between aggressiveness 
and restraint; the Board has suggested that 
the committee, when faced with a difficult 
decision, lean in the direction of serving the 
public interest.
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Committee procedures are uniformly 
applied to cases in a positive, structured 
manner. If analysis of the allegations of 
audit failure are not considered frivolous, 
the QCIC performs additional stipulated 
procedures until it concludes that the firm's 
quality controls and compliance therewith 
are satisfactory. If such satisfaction is not 
obtained through its inquiry and investiga­
tive procedures, a special review is ordered 
with a scope tailored by the results ob­
tained from its prior procedures.
Approach to Special Reviews.
To further implement its recently adopted 
structured approach, the QCIC drafted 
guidelines for performing special reviews 
and intends to order more special reviews 
to be performed, particularly those focusing 
on other audits supervised by the manage­
ment team on the allegedly faulty audit.
The draft guidelines give the special 
review team captain the option of using 
personnel of the firm to be reviewed in a 
review capacity. The committee believes, 
and the Board concurs, that such reviews 
may be more effective because of the inti­
mate knowledge such personnel have of 
the firm's quality control system, and 
would have the concomitant benefit of 
reducing the cost of special reviews.
The Board, however, believes that 
personnel of the firm to be reviewed may 
not be perceived as being sufficiently 
objective to serve as members of special 
review teams. The Board communicated its 
views to the QCIC, recommending that, at a 
minimum, no person be assigned to a spe­
cial review team that is to review a part of 
a firm's quality control system that such 
person had recently opined on.
We commend the QCIC for its willing­
ness to conduct more special reviews in 
defined circumstances and for its concern 
that member firms not be unduly burdened 
by the cost of such reviews. We believe 
that the above-described policy for appoint­
ment of members to special review teams
will result in effective and cost-efficient 
special reviews, and will enhance the pub­
lic's perception of the objectivity and credi­
bility of the process.
Possible SEC Endorsement o f the 
QCIC Process. The Chief Accountant of 
the SEC has indicated that he believes that, 
whenever the allegations indicate that the 
firm's quality control policies may not have 
been complied with, the QCIC should re­
quire that a review be conducted of other 
engagements supervised by the profes­
sionals involved in the allegedly failed audit. 
In addition, he indicated that the format of 
the closed case summary needed to be 
expanded to include the bases for the 
QCIC's various actions.
Members of the Chief Accountant's 
staff met with our staff on several occa­
sions in the 1988-89 year to review and 
discuss cases on which the QCIC had con­
cluded its inquiries. The SEC staff was 
complimentary of QCIC efforts and of the 
effectiveness of POB oversight, but con­
cluded that the closed case summaries 
provided did not include sufficient detail 
about (a) the inquiries made by the QCIC,
(b) the results obtained from such inquiries, 
and (c) the basis for actions taken.
POB-QCIC joint meeting on September 14, 1988.
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During the year, discussions were held 
within the Section seeking to find a format 
for the closed case summary that could 
serve as a basis for satisfactory SEC moni­
toring of QCIC activities without unduly 
prejudicing the outcome of litigation. A task 
force of Executive and QCIC members and 
house counsels of member firms was ap­
pointed to study this matter.
We believe that appropriate attention 
is being given to securing full SEC endorse­
ment of the process. Whether the closed 
case summary can be as comprehensive as 
the Chief Accountant would like without 
significantly affecting the litigation risk of 
firms is a question we cannot answer. Since 
the Commission is a responsible federal
agency that appreciates the difficulties in 
resolving the legal issues regarding SEC 
access, the Board remains confident that 
an accommodation can be reached where­
by the SEC will be able to provide endorse­
ment. We pledge ourselves to work closely 
with the Section and the SEC to this end.
The Board must emphasize, however, 
that SEC endorsement of the process will 
not in itself make the process more effec­
tive or more in the public interest. Given 
the present quality of QCIC performance, 
SEC endorsement of the process is sought 
for only one reason—to enhance credibility 
of the process to the public.
POB Chairman A l 
Sommer, AICPA 
Chairman Bob May, 
and AICPA President 
Phil Chenok with POB 
Vice Chairman Bob 
Mautz at meeting on 
December 14, 1988.
Public Oversight Board /  1988-89 Annual Report 19
We have monitored the activities of the 
Section's Executive and Planning Commit­
tees and conclude the public interest and 
the interest of member firms were reasonably 
balanced in the setting of rules and member­
ship requirements.
Extent o f QCIC Jurisdiction. On
September 1 , 1988, the Board wrote to the 
Executive Committee expressing its con­
cerns about an interpretation the commit­
tee had given to paragraph six of the 
QCIC's organizational document when it 
decided not to grant the QCIC's request for 
jurisdiction in a matter of litigation alleging 
audit failure on a non-public company audit. 
Paragraph six reads:
"The [QCIC] committee may identify a 
significant public interest in an alleged 
audit failure that is not required to be 
reported to the committee. The execu­
tive committee shall determine what 
actions, if  any, shall be taken by the 
section with respect to such matters."
In its letter to the Executive Commit­
tee, the Board indicated that it was more 
concerned with the sharply divergent inter­
pretations of the relevant paragraph by the 
QCIC and the Executive Committee than 
with the fact that the QCIC was not granted 
jurisdiction over the case in question. Con­
sequently, the Board urged that the widely 
differing interpretations of the two commit­
tees be resolved and the meaning of this 
paragraph be clarified.
A task force of Executive and QCIC 
members was formed for this purpose.
Soon after its formation, the task force was 
asked to recommend how paragraph six 
should be applied to the host of non-public 
savings and loan institutions that had 
recently become insolvent. As discussed 
below, the major question was whether 
the QCIC should be given jurisdiction over 
lawsuits against accountants initiated by 
federal agencies, such as the FDIC and 
FSLIC, which litigation would not be report­
able to the QCIC because the financial insti­
tutions are not public entities as defined in
the membership requirements.
Concern for the Public Interest in 
S&L Cases. The task force recommended 
and the Executive Committee adopted an 
interpretation of paragraph six which con­
cluded that (a) there is a significant public 
interest in S&Ls and in financial institutions 
in general, and (b) the QCIC should conduct 
inquiries into all litigation initiated by federal 
agencies such as the FDIC and FSLIC which 
alleges failure in connection with the audits 
of financial institutions. The intrepretation 
does not impose a reporting obligation on 
member firms. Instead, the QCIC, when it 
becomes aware of the initiation of litigation 
by a federal agency, will request the firm to 
provide a copy of the complaint, which the 
QCIC would screen to ascertain if it raises 
quality control questions. If the complaint 
raises such questions, the QCIC will seek 
the firm's agreement for the QCIC to add 
the case to its agenda and subject it to 
standard inquiry procedures. If the firm 
either refuses to provide the complaint or 
objects to it being added to the QCIC's 
agenda, the Executive Committee is to 
decide the action to be taken.
The Board agrees that there is signifi­
cant public interest in cases involving finan­
cial institutions and that such cases merit, 
at a minimum, the above-described QCIC 
special procedures.
We expressed reservations about the 
procedures in one respect. The QCIC has no 
authority to become involved with allega­
tions of audit failure unless litigation has 
been initiated. It will not, for example, deal 
with matters such as the six alleged audit 
failures on bankrupt S&Ls reported by the 
GAO unless they become the subject of 
litigation. These six "cases" were officially 
reported to the AICPA before litigation had 
been initiated for some of them. The AICPA 
referred them to its Professional Ethics 
Division. This division traditionally deals 
only with complaints against individuals 
and only when litigation or threat of litiga­
tion does not exist. We believe the quality 
control implications of allegations of audit
failure against firms should be dealt with 
by the Section regardless of whether 
litigation is initiated.
We have asked the Executive Commit­
tee to reconsider whether the quality con­
trol implications of alleged audit failures by 
member firms charged by a governmental 
regulatory agency should be considered by 
the QCIC.
In this regard, however, we commend 
the profession for its performance as the 
savings and loan crisis was unfolding. The 
AICPA repeatedly refused to countenance 
"make believe" accounting practices urged 
by the regulatory authorities. Its sensitivity 
and conduct were well stated in AICPA 
President Philip B. Chenok's testimony 
before the House Committee on Bank­
ing, Finance and Urban Affairs in February 
1989.
Lawsuits Involving Other Non- 
Public Entities. With respect to the afore­
mentioned task force's initial charge to 
provide guidance on how "significant public 
interest" in paragraph six of the QCIC's 
organizational document should be inter­
preted, the task force concluded there was 
no need to issue additional guidance on the 
meaning of the phrase. The Executive Com­
mittee concurred, stating subsequent dis­
cussions between representatives of the 
two committees indicated that existing 
materials were adequate and that the 
determination of "significant public inter­
est" could be made effectively on a case- 
by-case basis. The Board directed its staff 
to monitor the Section's actions in dealing 
with alleged audit failures by governmental 
agencies of non-public companies that are 
brought to the attention of the QCIC.
Concurring Partner Review 
Requirement. The Board regards a preis­
suance review of audits of public compa­
nies as a key quality control procedure and 
accordingly strongly endorses the Section's 
concurring partner review requirement.
The Board recognizes that smaller 
firms have difficulty in complying with this
strengthened requirement because they 
may not have a qualified concurring 
reviewer. Thus, they must look outside the 
firm for help. In the current litigious environ­
ment, outside reviewers are not easy to 
find. Consequently, the Board urged the 
Section to study ways in which the Section 
could assist smaller firms in complying 
with the requirement. This is especially 
important if the AlCPA's proposal is 
adopted that would require that CPAs in 
firms with SEC clients be allowed to retain 
individual membership in the AICPA only if 
their firms are members of the Section. In 
this regard, we have been informed that 
the liability insurance policy issued under 
the Institute's plan provides coverage for an 
outside second reviewer if such review is 
performed under a contractual relationship, 
but only on a claims-made basis, which can 
expose the reviewer to a significant liability 
risk. Therefore, we urge the Section to ex­
plore all possible ways to enable member 
firms to make themselves available to other 
member firms for such reviews without 
unreasonable risk, and, when that is done, 
to compile and make public a list of such 
available reviewers.
Direct Communication with the 
SEC on Termination o f Audit-Client 
Relationship. We commend the Section 
for the practical resolution of a difficult 
problem, namely, keeping the SEC 
informed when an audit firm becomes 
aware that its audit relationship with an 
SEC registrant has ended. The Section 
adopted a new membership requirement 
effective May 1, 1989, requiring member 
firms to send the former client a letter 
within five business days of becoming 
aware of the termination of the audit client 
relationship. The auditor is also required to 
send a copy of such letter to the SEC Chief 
Accountant to serve as notification that a 
Form 8K should have been filed by the 
registrant reporting the fact and circum­
stances of a change in auditors.
20
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Mandatory Quality Review. The
AICPA continues its efforts to expand the 
scope of its self-regulatory program for 
accounting firms. The coming year will 
mark the commencement of a new quality 
review program, adopted in 1988 by an 
overwhelming vote of the AlCPA's individ­
ual members. As a result, to qualify for 
individual membership in the AICPA, a CPA 
in public practice must be a member of a 
firm whose quality control system is sub­
jected periodically to either a peer review 
or a quality review. As of June 30, 1989, 
39,300 firms had enrolled in the new quality 
review program; an additional 4,700 firms 
are members of either the SEC Practice 
Section or the Private Companies Practice 
Section, both of which have mandatory 
peer review requirements. All members of 
the accounting profession can take pride in 
the scope and rigor of the profession's self- 
regulatory program, and the commitment 
of so many of its members to the program.
The major differences between a 
review under the new quality review (QR) 
program and an SECPS peer review are: 
SECPS peer review results are placed in a 
public file while QR results are non-public; 
SECPS peer reviews are subject to POB 
oversight and peer reviews of firms that 
audit SEC registrants may be selected for 
review by the SEC; SECPS imposes rigor­
ous additional requirements upon its mem­
bers, such as mandatory rotation of the 
partner-in-charge of audits of SEC regis­
trants, mandatory preissuance review by 
another partner of audits of SEC registrants, 
proscription of specified consulting ser­
vices, and mandatory reporting of informa­
tion about consulting services performed 
for SEC registrants to audit committees of 
such registrants.
In a March 6 , 1989 report addressed to 
Congressman Dingell's Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations, the GAO 
criticized the SEC for failure to adopt a rule 
requiring auditors of SEC registrants to 
undergo periodic peer reviews. The POB
has stated repeatedly that a firm auditing 
one or more public companies should be 
required to have its quality control system 
periodically reviewed by a competent and 
independent peer. Consequently, the Board 
hopes that AICPA members will approve a 
current proposal to strengthen the profes­
sion's self-regulatory program. At its 1989 
Spring Meeting, the AICPA Council 
approved reballoting on the Anderson 
Committee's recommendation that a CPA 
with a firm auditing an SEC registrant be 
denied individual AICPA membership if 
such firm is not a member of the SEC Prac­
tice Section. The Board urges all AICPA 
members to cast an affirmative ballot when 
the matter is voted on in the fall of 1989. 
While the Board clearly prefers that matters 
such as these be dealt with through self- 
regulatory processes, if the current effort to 
secure AICPA membership approval of 
mandatory membership in the SEC Practice 
Section for firms auditing SEC registrants 
fails, the Board will strongly urge the SEC 
to adopt its proposal for mandatory peer 
review as published in April 1987, hopefully 
modified as the Board suggested in its 
comments on the proposal.
POB member Paul McCracken, 
FDIC Chairman William Seidman, 
and POB members Mel Laird and 
Bob Froehlke at POB meeting on 
May 1, 1989.
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Conclusions
and
Commentary
The POB has never been in the direct 
"chain of command" in the Section's self- 
regulatory program, and it has never indi­
cated that this would be desirable. Our task 
is to represent the public's interest in the 
quality of independent auditing, and to 
accomplish this oversight by overseeing 
the activities of the accounting profes­
sionals conducting the programs.
The activities of the Section are impor­
tant components of the accounting profes­
sion's self-regulatory program. Successful 
operation of the program gives reasonable 
assurance that its member firms meet pro­
fessional standards for accounting and 
auditing services, but it cannot guarantee 
continuation of quality service.
Therefore, top managements of CPA 
firms must continually emphasize that the 
provision of high quality auditing services is 
their primary objective. In this regard, we 
believe the leaders of the profession face a 
difficult and challenging task. The following 
commentary identifies the bases for that 
belief.
Professionalism. Public accounting 
firms are undergoing organizational meta­
morphoses and becoming involved in an 
ever-expanding scope of services for 
present and prospective clients. These 
services provide obvious profit opportuni­
ties for individual firms. While profits en­
sure the ability of a firm to provide quality 
audit services and enhance its ability to 
attract top quality people to the firm, the 
profit motive cannot be permitted to en­
danger the "professionalism" of firms.
The maintenance of the traditional 
concepts of professionalism, which em­
body integrity, objectivity, and competence, 
is essential. The profession at large and 
individual firms must be constantly mindful 
of the social importance of auditing and not 
judge professional success solely in eco­
nomic terms. Educators, providers of con­
tinuing professional education programs, 
and managements of CPA firms must con­
tinually reaffirm the need to maintain the 
credibility of the audit process.
Price Competition. The Board is 
concerned that an excessive emphasis on 
growth and profitability by public account­
ing firms could result in a deemphasis of 
the social responsibility of the independent 
auditor. Moreover, intense price competi­
tion for audit clients does damage to both 
the public image and the self-image of the 
auditor as an objective professional. Pricing 
services at or below cost may be perceived 
as "good business" for the purpose of ob­
taining clients in industries in which a firm 
has hitherto not been active. But if this 
leads to cutting the price of audit services 
as a regular practice to obtain new clients, 
the possibility of deterioration in the quality 
of the audit services then provided cannot 
be overlooked. Low realization on new 
clients can put a tremendous strain on the 
engagement team servicing them. In time, 
the initial rationale by firm management to 
charge lower-than-normal fees may be­
come obscured, resulting in pressures be­
ing brought on the audit teams to increase 
the "profitability" of services to the client.
In the worst case, this could result in inap­
propriate shortcuts in performing required 
audit procedures and a subsequent lower­
ing of audit quality.
Profits in Perspective. Public ac­
counting firms are changing. We see con­
tinuing increases in the proportion of total 
firm revenues provided by management 
advisory services (MAS) and a decline in 
the proportion provided by auditing. There 
is nothing wrong with that, per se, but it 
does raise a difficult question. Is there a 
point at which total fees or total net income 
derived from nonaudit services will lead to 
decreased attention by top management to 
the importance of audit professionalism?
Member firms are changing their char­
acters in other ways. As their marketing 
strategies are expanded with the acquisi­
tion of other service organizations, public 
accounting firms are accelerating their entry 
into a variety of markets unrelated to ac­
counting and auditing. It is not unusual to 
see an increasing array of services that are
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not derived from the firm's traditional ex­
pertise in accounting, auditing, and tax 
matters associated with the attest function. 
It is not difficult to visualize the day when 
independent auditing will be offered as but 
one of the many services provided by firms 
in a great variety of product and service 
markets throughout the world, and it is not 
difficult to argue that the importance of 
auditing to firms and to the profession may 
be diminished under such conditions with a 
commensurate hazard to the quality of 
auditing.
Our chairman, in his address to AICPA 
Council last spring, commented on these 
changes:
"There is an old golden rule, not the one 
that we are familiar with, but the one 
that says 'He who has the gold rules.'
As consulting services become a larger 
part o f practices and contribute more to 
profitability, /  think there will be chal­
lenges in firms to the leadership of 
those who have the professional ded­
ication that all of you have to quality 
auditing services.
That is a long-term problem. /  think it 
is one that the accounting profession 
must be sensitive to and it must work 
constantly to assure that there is no 
diminution for any reason in the quality 
of audit services that are rendered to 
the American public and abroad, too, 
for that matter.
/  think it is a matter o f psychological 
versus financial primacy. As more and 
more firms expand much more quickly 
their consulting practices than they do 
their auditing practices, the financial 
contributions that are made by the 
non-auditing services will grow 
proportionately."
Profits and growth are appropriate 
business objectives and both are necessary 
to the long-term viability of firms. There­
fore, a greater sharing of management deci­
sion-making powers with MAS and other 
non-audit personnel is likely inevitable. 
However, when pursuing "other" business
objectives, and to serve the public interest 
well, public accounting firms must take 
special care to remember that the audit of 
a public company carries responsibilities 
beyond those of any other service of the 
firm. To serve the public well and to meet 
these professional responsibilities, firms 
auditing public companies must continually 
emphasize the significance of their role as 
independent auditors, and must continue 
to take whatever steps are necessary to 
assure that the quality of audit services will 
not be diminished in any way.
Should the sensitivity of firms to the 
unique responsibility and privilege placed 
upon them as independent auditors be 
diluted, the profession and the business 
and financial community, as well as society 
in general, will have lost. As our vice chair­
man observed in his editorial referred to 
previously:
"If CPAs ever forget or neglect their 
responsibilities to society in audit prac­
tice, or are perceived to have neglected 
or forgotten that responsibility, that 
practice may become restricted, regu­
lated, or withdrawn from their exclusive 
privilege by the society that granted it 
and now feels itself ill-served."
Auditor Independence. A segment 
of the public accounting profession is advo­
cating the acceptability of a limited com­
mercial community of interest with audit 
clients, such as permitting an auditor to 
enter into a contractor or subcontractor 
relationship with an audit client to provide 
services to a third party, when the fees 
involved are deemed to be immaterial to 
both parties. While there appears little dan­
ger in the specific proposal at issue, it does 
chip away ever so slightly at audit indepen­
dence and one chip tends to beget another. 
And if the concept of audit independence 
erodes, it may be difficult to restore. Any 
change in independence rules requires the 
most careful consideration, because inde­
pendence is the hallmark of the auditing 
profession.
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This matter is under consideration by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
We have urged the Commission to request 
public comment to assist it in determining 
whether the proposal at issue should be 
favorably acted upon.
Litigation Alleging Audit Failure.
The accounting profession continues to be 
the target of lawsuits claiming enormous 
damages for allegedly faulty audits. The 
Board's oversight activity with respect to 
the Quality Control Inquiry Committee en­
tails a review of all the complaints that are 
filed against member firms alleging faulty 
audits of publicly-held companies. This 
review indicates that in many cases audit­
ing firms are charged with derelictions 
when they clearly should not be. Further, 
while many cases charge some involve­
ment of the auditor in faulty financial re­
porting, it is clear the main responsibility is 
not the auditor's.
Regardless of the merits of the 
charges, any suit results in considerable 
cost and inconvenience. The AICPA ap­
pointed a task force to develop means by 
which the burden of litigation might be 
reduced. We encourage that effort, and we 
urge that the courts move more aggres­
sively to dispose quickly of suits against 
accountants that are clearly ill-founded. 
However, it must be recognized that some 
suits are meritorious, that accounting firms 
do not and should not escape their respon­
sibility to investors and creditors for the 
quality of their work, and that inevitably 
they will be held accountable for faulty 
work. The possibility of civil litigation may 
be an inducement for some firms to main­
tain and strengthen the quality of their au­
dit activity. However, it is clear that the 
courts have not yet developed sufficient 
procedures to separate out those suits 
without reasonable foundation from those 
having such a basis.
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Every major financial settlement and 
every decision against a public accounting 
firm for investor compensation, justified or 
not, makes the profession less attractive to 
students as well as to practitioners. Fortu­
nately for them, those now active in the 
profession and those preparing for it are 
also well qualified for alternative careers. 
Unfortunately for the public, their shifting 
to other careers will lessen rather than 
maintain the present quality of auditing 
services.
Regulatory Measures Affecting  
Professionalism. A settlement agree­
ment between the Federal Trade Commis­
sion and the AICPA is pending, under 
which the Institute will remove from its 
rules the ban on members engaging in 
certain activities on a contingent fee or 
commission basis for non-attest clients. 
The Board does not at this time wish to 
comment on the wisdom or desirability of
this settlement. However, it is concerned 
with suggestions made by FTC staff that, 
in the interests of expanding competition, 
there should be no barriers against owner­
ship of accounting firms by outside inves­
tors.
Similar suggestions have been made 
in the United Kingdom and in the European 
Economic Community. The Board believes 
these proposals are an invitation to disaster. 
Outside investors in accounting firms 
would have only one objective, the maximi­
zation of profit, and they would not be likely 
to have as healthy a concern for profession­
alism and adherence to professional stand­
ards in the conduct of audits.
We would hope that governmental 
authorities and agencies in this country and 
elsewhere will realize that the public is ill- 
served by such changes, ostensibly to stim­
ulate competition, that could erode profes­
sional commitments and standards. We are
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pleased tha t there have been som e indica­
tions by m em bers o f the Federal Trade 
C om m ission o f sens itiv ity  to  these 
concerns.
Mergers o f Larger CPA Firms. In
recent m onths, six o f the so-called "B ig 
E ight" accounting firm s have e ither m erged 
or announced tha t they are considering 
merger. The im plica tions o f these events, 
both  in th is  coun try  and th roughou t the 
w orld , are not ye t clear. The im pact these 
m ergers m ay have upon the activ ities o f 
the SEC Practice Section is now  being s tud ­
ied. Since the beginning o f the program, 
these large firm s have typ ica lly  engaged a 
s im ilar firm  to  conduct the ir peer reviews. 
Som e o f these firm s, fo r various reasons, 
have not conducted peer reviews. Hence, 
a tten tion  m ust be given to  the continu ing 
availab ility  o f large firm s capable o f rev iew ­
ing, and being w illing  to  review, o ther large 
firm s.
These m ergers should not per se result 
in a d im inu tion  o f qua lity  aud iting  by the 
resulting firm s. However, som e o f the  ten ­
dencies and trends discussed above m ay 
be accentuated by them . W e in tend to  
m on ito r closely the consequences o f these 
m ergers and make recom m endations, as
applicable, d irected at m ainta in ing the qual­
ity  o f the se lf-regulatory program s o f the 
profession. In discharging our oversight 
responsibility, w e  m ust assure the public 
tha t the qua lity  o f aud iting  perform ed by 
these firm s  is not adversely affected.
The Role o f Auditing. Our com plex 
econom y dem ands reliable financial data as 
a basis fo r the allocation o f credit, capital, 
and resources in general. An indispensable 
requirem ent fo r the e ffective  function ing  o f 
our liberal, market-organized, capita listic 
econom y is accurate, dependable audited 
financial in fo rm ation  about the results o f a 
com pany's operations. Thus, the indepen­
dent aud ito r plays an absolute ly necessary 
role fo r the successful operation o f our 
capita listic econom y. The public interest 
and the interest o f c lient m anagem ents w ill 
no t be w ell served if the  qua lity  o f auditing 
services declines.
Society has granted certified public 
accountants an exclusive franchise to  audit 
financial s ta tem ents and has allow ed the 
profession, in large measure, to  set and 
enforce its standards. The profession's 
standard-setting and se lf-regulatory activ i­
ties are w ork ing  and obvia te  the need fo r
POB meeting with PRC representatives on November 1, 1988.
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public sector legislation and regulatory 
initiatives. In a real sense, self-regulation 
benefits society by providing a relatively 
cost-free control system over activities that 
could not be controlled as effectively in any 
other way.
Therefore, loss of auditor indepen­
dence, or even a perception of a lessening 
of auditor independence, are problems to 
which the profession must be sensitive.
We find no evidence that there has 
been any deterioration in the quality of 
independent audit services in this country. 
At the same time, we cannot deny or ig­
nore the potential for deterioration in the 
trends discussed.
For that reason, those involved in the 
self-regulatory components of the account­
ing profession's program must not become 
complacent about the program's success.
A soundly conceived, thoroughly sup­
ported, and ever vigilant self-regulatory 
system is essential to provide the investing 
public with the quality of service it needs, 
expects, and demands.
We urge the present leaders of the 
profession to continue the fine tradition set 
by their predecessors in utilizing the self- 
regulatory program to improve the quality 
of auditing practice in the United States 
and thus to contribute to the public good.
Finally, a personal note. Because of 
his retirement, this is the last report of the 
Public Oversight Board with which Louis 
W. Matusiak will be associated. Lou capped 
his long and varied career in accounting 
with eleven years of service as the first 
Executive Director of the Public Oversight 
Board. He is the one who, writing on a 
clean slate and with no precedents to fol­
low, devised, developed, and directed our 
oversight programs, and helped develop 
the role of the Board and the manner in 
which it interacts with the SEC Practice 
Section and the relevant divisions of the
AICPA. He has indeed been a pioneer and a 
seminal thinker, and it is no exaggeration to 
say that without him the peer review and 
QCIC programs would not have been the 
successes they have been.
We salute Lou; we will miss him; we 
will benefit in the years to come from the 
tradition of excellence and dedication 
which he established; and we hope we 
may continue to call upon him for guidance 
and wisdom in the acquitance of our duties.
One of the legacies Lou is leaving us is 
a remarkably dedicated and competent 
staff. He has brought aboard only the best: 
our Technical Director Chuck Evers, our two 
Assistant Technical Directors Alan Feldman 
and John Cullen—all professionals in the 
truest sense. We express our admiration of 
them, we salute them, and in doing so we 
express our gratitude to Lou for them.
Looking to the future, we are enor­
mously pleased that Jerry D. Sullivan, 
recently chairman of the Auditing Standards 
Board as it developed the most important 
"expectation gap standards" and a partner 
of Coopers & Lybrand, has agreed to 
become the executive director of the Board. 
Jerry is an outstanding professional who 
will, we are sure, continue the standards of 
competence and professionalism estab­
lished by Lou Matusiak.
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